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Sequential evidence accumulation in decision making: the
individual desired level of confidence can explain the extent of
information acquisition
Abstract
Judgments and decisions under uncertainty are frequently linked to a prior sequential search for relevant
information. In such cases, the subject has to decide when to stop the search for information. Evidence
accumulation models from social and cognitive psychology assume an active and sequential information
search until enough evidence has been accumulated to pass a decision threshold. In line with such
theories, we conceptualize the evidence threshold as the “desired level of confidence” (DLC) of a
person. This model is tested against a fixed stopping rule (one-reason decision making) and against the
class of multi-attribute information integrating models. A series of experiments using an information
board for horse race betting demonstrates an advantage of the proposed model by measuring the
individual DLC of each subject and confirming its correctness in two separate stages. In addition to a
better understanding of the stopping rule (within the narrow framework of simple heuristics), the results
indicate that individual aspiration levels might be a relevant factor when modelling decision making by
task analysis of statistical environments.
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Abstract
Judgments and decisions under uncertainty are frequently linked to a prior sequential search for relevant information.
In such cases, the subject has to decide when to stop the search for information. Evidence accumulation models from
social and cognitive psychology assume an active and sequential information search until enough evidence has been
accumulated to pass a decision threshold. In line with such theories, we conceptualize the evidence threshold as the
“desired level of confidence” (DLC) of a person. This model is tested against a fixed stopping rule (one-reason deci-
sion making) and against the class of multi-attribute information integrating models. A series of experiments using an
information board for horse race betting demonstrates an advantage of the proposed model by measuring the individual
DLC of each subject and confirming its correctness in two separate stages. In addition to a better understanding of the
stopping rule (within the narrow framework of simple heuristics), the results indicate that individual aspiration levels
might be a relevant factor when modelling decision making by task analysis of statistical environments.
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1 Introduction
“Some use it sometimes.”
This is the short statement by which Newell (2005)
concluded the empirical research on the well-known
Take-the-Best heuristic (TTB). This fast and frugal
heuristic was introduced by Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and
Kleinbölting (1991) and Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996)
to provide an alternative to traditionally proposed strate-
gies in judgment and decision making research. Accord-
ing to these traditional models, a rational decision re-
quires a comprehensive integration of all available in-
formation about all alternatives. Such integration can
become computationally complex as soon as informa-
tion cues are probabilistic and numerous. Gigerenzer
and Goldstein (1996), however, were able to show by a
simulation of a binary attribute cue paradigm that choos-
ing the best alternative (out of two) can be very simple
when searching the available cues in the sequential or-
der of descending validity (the probability that a cue will
lead to the correct decision, given that it discriminates
between the alternatives) and deciding on the direction
∗Address: Daniel Hausmann, Psychologisches Institut der Univer-
sität Zürich, Allgemeine Psychologie (Kognition), Binzmühlestrasse 14
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of the first discriminating cue. In the stimulus environ-
ment they used (German cities, their population size and
a number of features being present in the cities or not),
this simple three-step-heuristic (containing a search rule,
a stopping rule and a decision rule) led to decisions of the
same quality as a comprehensive computational integra-
tion of the entire set of cue information. The termination
of information search after having found a first discrimi-
nating cue has therefore been called one-reason decision
making (ORDM) (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999).
The term ORDM was chosen in clear contrast to mod-
els that stand for the integration of all available infor-
mation (usually not reflecting how the information was
compiled). These models can be of varying complexity,
ranging from simple tallying to complex multiple linear
regression (for an overview, see Payne, Bettman & John-
son, 1993, or Doyle, 1999. Lee & Cummins, 2004, group
them as “rational models”). What they have in common is
that at least two pieces of information need to be present
for starting a comparison and, in case of several cues in-
dicating the same option, an integration of the available
information. In contrast to the class of ORDM, we sub-
sume this broad class under the term “more-reason deci-
sion making” (MRDM), because the search for more than
one discriminating piece of information is a prerequisite
229
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for information integration.
TTB, as the most prominent representative of ORDM,
reveals an impressively high number of correct pre-
dictions, compared to MRDM models (see Gigerenzer,
Czerlinski & Martignon, 1999, for simulation studies).
These mathematical results allow TTB to rank amongst
the rational strategies to be used in probabilistic decision
making, especially (but not only) when information needs
to be searched for.
However, the empirical findings concerning the use of
TTB — compared to MRDM models — were heteroge-
neous. While the conclusions of some studies were gen-
erally against the use of TTB because they found only
particular use of this strategy (Bröder, 2000; Lee & Cum-
mins, 2004; Newell & Shanks, 2003; Newell, Weston &
Shanks, 2003), a survey of more recent studies shows
more evidence for the use of TTB (Bröder & Schiffer,
2003; see the overview in Bröder, 2005). One unresolved
question is the fact that participants repeatedly showed a
huge inter- and intra-individual inconsistency in using a
single strategy (Läge & Daub, 2006). So far, there have
been no statistical environments in which all participants
of an experiment acted according to TTB or refrained
from using it. But what is even more problematic is the
inconsistent use of the ORDM stopping rule. The most
surprising effect was reported by Newell, Weston and
Shanks (2003): Testing a sequential search paradigm us-
ing only two available cues, they found a number of par-
ticipants (32% of their sample) continuing information
search in some instances even when the more valid cue
discriminated, hence completely ignoring the fact that the
second cue would not be able to compensate the first in-
formation! As an overall judgment, the conclusion drawn
by Newell still holds: “Some of the people made choices
consistent with TTB some of the time” (Newell, 2005, p.
12).
1.0.1 Modelling the information acquisition process
under uncertainty
The order in which probabilistic cues are to be searched
depends on the individual weight of the cue parameters
(at least cue validity and discrimination rate, i.e. the
proportion of occasions on which a cue value is differ-
ent for two objects in a two alternative comparison task;
see Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999; Newell, Rakow, We-
ston & Shanks, 2004; Dieckmann & Todd, 2005; Läge,
Hausmann, Christen & Daub, 2005; Todd & Dieckmann,
2005). Whenever the discrimination rate is not relevant,
only two search strategies are reasonable: a cue search
in descending order of validities (as specified in TTB)
or a random selection strategy of cues which has been
called the Minimalist search rule (Martignon & Hoffrage,
1999). The decision maker’s knowledge about cue validi-
ties determines which of these two search rules is adap-
tive: TTB search rule is normatively required when cue
validities are known, whereas Minimalist search rule is
the only possible search strategy when cue validities are
unknown.
In both cases, the crucial question is about the stopping
rule: at which point do people stop their search for infor-
mation? When focussing on the decision rules (ORDM
versus information integration in MRDM), the answer
should be related to the general strategy of decision mak-
ing that an individual prefers (one-reason stopping after
the first discriminating cue versus more-reason stopping
depending on the specific integration model). Focussing
on the information acquisition process, however, an alter-
native answer would be that people will (ideally) termi-
nate search when they have subjectively collected enough
information, which means they have enough evidence to
determine which of the options is the right or the best one.
This assumption can be based on experimental find-
ings that show a very clear relation between stopping
behaviour and estimated cue validity in a learning ex-
periment conducted by Hausmann, Christen, and Läge
(2005): over a learning period of 50 trials, people ob-
served the ratio of correct/incorrect answers from four ex-
perts who gave advice in a quiz show. In a second stage,
they became participants of that quiz show and were able
to seek advice from one or more of these experts. As to be
expected, people started their search with the expert they
had perceived to give the most valid answers. The stop-
ping rule, however, very much depended on the perceived
validity of this best adviser: the higher the perceived va-
lidity was, the higher the tendency towards ORDM.
1.0.2 Models with an explicit level of confidence as a
stopping rule
Approaches that place the stopping rule in the foreground
and make it dependent on the quality of the searched cue
information have been called evidence accumulation, or
evidence accrual, or sequential-sampling process models,
for they consist of an evidence threshold, the reaching
or exceeding of which results in the termination of the
information search (for a list of specific models according
to this class of approaches, see Lee & Cummins, 2004, p.
346; Rouder, 2001, p. 335; or Leth-Steensen & Marley,
2000, p. 65). The direction of the decision (the preferred
option) has already crystallized and the effective choice
(the decision rule) therefore remains trivial.
The “satisficing principle” of Herbert Simon (1955;
1956) was an early threshold model in decision making
theories, intended as a direct rejection of the a priori nor-
mative view provided by the utility maximization prin-
ciple of Subjective Expected Utility theory. Rather than
maximizing the overall utility of all available options, Si-
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mon postulated that people search for options only until
the first one met or exceeded an aspiration level. Whereas
Simon had focused on the search for options and the eval-
uation of their overall utilities, one can assume a “suffi-
ciency” principle for the search for probability cue infor-
mation when options are given: how much cue informa-
tion do people need to make a good or correct decision?
People perhaps want to find out not only what the best
decision is, but they also want to reach a certain level of
confidence before making their final decision.
Lee and Cummins (2004) described such a sequential-
sampling process as a random walk, acquiring probabilis-
tic cue information step-by-step either until an evidence
threshold is reached or the remaining information cannot
outperform the current evidence gathered for the best op-
tion. By that way they construct a unifying model for
ORDM and MRDM, integrating both as special cases
given that the individual evidence threshold is reached
immediately (ORDM) or not (MRDM) during the infor-
mation acquisition process.
An evidence (or confidence) threshold can be viewed
in two ways: either as a relative threshold (value differ-
ence) or as an absolute threshold (level of confidence).
On the one hand, some of the approaches of evidence ac-
cumulation models dealing with a sufficiency-principle
expect termination of information search as soon as se-
quentially accumulated value differences of cues have
reached or exceeded a certain threshold. The searching
process “is stopped and an alternative is chosen when a
person has accumulated enough evidence to be convinced
that one alternative is better than the other” (Aschenbren-
ner, Albert & Schmalhofer, 1984, p. 154). The crite-
rion dependent choice (CDC) model for binary choices
from Aschenbrenner et al. (1984) has until now predicted
choices in various domains better than, for example, an
additive model. On the other hand, some evidence accu-
mulation models indicates stopping as soon as the desired
confidence level of an option has reached, or exceeded, a
certain threshold. A sufficiency principle, for example, is
formulated in the heuristic-systematic model by Chaiken,
Liberman, and Eagly: “People will exert whatever level
of effort is required to attain a sufficient degree of confi-
dence. . . ” (1989, p. 221). Processing efforts are assumed
to be a function of the discrepancy that exists between ac-
tual and desired levels of confidence (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993).1
1To distinguish, the paper deals with three quantitative concepts: va-
lidity, evidence, and confidence. Validity describes the predictive qual-
ity of a cue, whilst evidence and confidence are related to the alterna-
tives. Evidence (as the probabilistic quality of an alternative) is a rather
cognitive term, whereas confidence describes the emotional state of a
person (etymologically referring to social relations). “Confidence rat-
ings” are a common measure in decision making to research the degree
of certainty a person has that a chosen alternative is correct. This can be
modelled either as discriminating difference between alternatives (for
1.0.3 Research question
According to an evidence accumulation model, the de-
cision to stop or to continue information acquisition de-
pends on the degree of certainty for the preferred op-
tion, and can therefore be very inconsistent in terms of
the number of cues which need to be acquired: one dis-
criminating cue can be sufficient when it provides a per-
son with a high degree of evidence. However, when the
validity is not high enough, the person prefers to con-
tinue information search. Different from ORDM (always
stopping after the first discriminating cue) and MRDM
(needing at least two discrimination cues), the stopping
rule would be a certain degree of confidence (a thresh-
old which can vary from individual to individual and may
also depend on the accessibility of cues).
Hence, it is the aim of this paper to propose a valid-
ity threshold as a stopping rule and to test in two exper-
iments whether such a threshold is better able to predict
the individual behaviour than a strict one-reason or more-
reason stopping rule. We assume that a threshold, like a
desired level of confidence (DLC), is the effective stop-
ping rule that people follow when searching for proba-
bility cues. As soon as the actual accumulated evidence
(= current confidence) has reached or exceeded the DLC,
people will stop further searching and decide on the di-
rection of the preferred option.
We present two experiments to measure and verify a
DLC in a multi-attribute probabilistic decision task with
several options. To be able to focus on the stopping rule,
the order of probabilistic cues to look at becomes a de-
fined aspect of the statistical environments of these ex-
periments: search rules will be fixed either as descending
validity (TTB environment) or in random order of valid-
ity (minimalist environment). By fixing the order of cues,
search rules become obsolete in that the only decision
to be made during the information acquisition process is
when to stop. For the experiments we will therefore talk
of “information acquisition” whenever there is no choice
of which cue to look at next and of “search” theoretically
in a more general way or when there is free choice in
choosing cue information.
example as the difference between the probabilities of the best two op-
tions to be the correct one) or as the probability of the best option. The
latter model is chosen to be used for this paper because it directly refers
to the degree of evidence a person has accumulated during the infor-
mation acquisition process. (In case of more than two alternatives, this
seems to be important because a difference model could lead to a high
value, but on a very low level of evidence.) Hence, confidence and evi-
dence are used in a similar manner because they are both expressed by
the same quantitative measure.
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2 Experiments
2.1 Experiment 1: Measuring and verify-
ing a confidence threshold2
2.1.1 Empirical evidence for the desired level of con-
fidence (DLC).
The fundamental idea in the empirical testing of a judg-
ment confidence threshold consisted in measuring the
stopping behaviour of people when confronted with a first
discriminating cue. A consistent ORDM-stopping rule is
given when people always terminate the search for in-
formation after uncovering the first piece of discriminat-
ing information, independent of the cue validity. On the
other hand, with an MRDM-stopping rule, one will never
be satisfied with a single individual discriminating cue
(independent of the cue-validities). People will always
search for at least two discriminating cues in order to in-
tegrate these into their final decision. A consequent appli-
cation of a judgment confidence threshold with a certain
desired level of confidence (DLC) indeed looks very dif-
ferent: the first discriminating cue is examined according
to its validity. If the validity of this cue corresponds to,
or even lies above, the DLC, the search is immediately
stopped and one will decide for that option based on the
direction in which the cue points (the observed behaviour
corresponds to an ORDM-stopping rule strategy). If, on
the other hand, the validity of the first discriminating cue
is lower than the DLC, the search will be continued (the
observed behaviour tends towards an MRDM-stopping
rule strategy). In order to examine a confidence thresh-
old, it is sufficient to measure the stopping behaviour of a
person dependent on the validity of the first discriminat-
ing cue by checking whether this information is accepted
for making an immediate decision, or whether the search
is continued (by looking at the next cue).
In order to keep the method of measurement as sim-
ple as possible, the discrimination rates of the cues in the
experiments were set at the maximum of 1.00: every un-
covered cue provided useful — discriminating — infor-
mation. The maximum discrimination rate was achieved
by using the “personified cues” proposed by Läge, Haus-
mann, Christen, and Daub (2005). These cues are direct
predictions given by persons with a certain amount of ex-
pertise, indicating which of the options they would chose.
Whilst the concept of attribute cues (like in the Gigeren-
zer & Goldstein, 1996, set of cities and their attributes)
leads to a limited discrimination rate, the personified cues
always discriminate as long as the cue predicts exactly
one option as being the best one. Both cue classes can be
used in the same way for information board designs be-
2Data from this experiment are presented in the proceedings book of
the German Cognitive Science Conference (Hausmann & Läge, 2005).
cause they lead to identical structures of binary cue val-
ues. (Since the experimental design as described below
deals with four options per trial, the attribution cue con-
cept would lead to many non-discriminating cues making
the experiment long-lasting and does not support efficient
research on the stopping rule.)
Acquisition costs were introduced in order to avoid
participants being able to uncover all the cues. The ac-
quisition costs per cue in relation to the potential profit
increase were fixed at a ratio of 1:10, because earlier in-
vestigations have shown that this ratio evokes a high pro-
portion of ORDM (Hausmann, Christen & Läge, 2006).
2.1.2 Overcoming the measuring problem
The evidence of a judgment confidence threshold was ex-
amined in two separate stages in the same experimental
session. The trials in Stage 1 were used for individually
fitting the “desired level of confidence” parameter. The
obtained value was then tested in Stage 2 by independent
trials using the same set of data. (Participants were not
informed about this fitting/testing separation nor did they
know that three stopping rules were examined.)
The easiest way to measure a “desired level of confi-
dence” is to check whether a person is satisfied with a
piece of information of certain validity. This satisfac-
tion can be documented by the stop of information ac-
quisition, whilst dissatisfaction would lead to a contin-
ued search for information. Hence, we used this stop-
ping behaviour as a predictor of an individual DLC by
providing people with cues of differing validities and ob-
serving which cues led to their satisfaction and which
did not. The DLCs were solely fitted from the first cues
observed in each trial (preventing us from assuming cer-
tain models of information integration). Whenever peo-
ple stopped further information acquisition after the first
cue, the DLC was assumed to be lower than its valid-
ity. Whenever an individual continued information ac-
quisition, the DLC was assumed to be higher. Testing
the range of possible validities, the individual “changing
point” could be detected.
Should an individual be inconsistent in his or her stop-
ping behaviour (accepting a lower validity for stopping
than the highest “rejected” validity — and vice versa), the
optimal threshold needs to be calculated; this was done
by minimizing the sum of squared errors.3
3The following trials of a subject were counted as errors a) where
the validity of the first uncovered cue above an assumed threshold was
not accepted to terminate information acquisition, and b) any validity
below this threshold that was accepted to stop acquisition after the first
cue. The magnitude of each error was then calculated as the difference
between threshold level and cue validity. The sum of the squared er-
rors determines the degree of appropriateness of this assumed level as
an estimate of the DLC of that individual. That individual threshold
was finally chosen for which the sum of these squared differences was
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Figure 1: A typical judgment trial on the information
board with four options (horses A to D). In this example,
a cue with a validity of .75 (indicated as number of correct
predictions in the last 100 races) was first uncovered. The
participant stopped looking for further cues and decided
for horse A (in which direction the cue pointed). In gen-
eral, search costs (CHF 30 per uncovered cue) were sub-
tracted independent of a correct prediction (CHF 300).
After having completed Stage 1, the best fit was auto-
matically calculated for each participant. This value was
taken as hypothetical DLC to be tested by independent
data conducted in Stage 2 of the experiment: it contained
20 trials which were individually compiled from a list of
trials starting with all different validities. Half of the tri-
als covered the range between .03 and .21 above the indi-
vidual DLC, the other half were below that value (same
range between .03 and .21). Assuming the DLC mea-
sured in Stage 1 to be correct, the participant should stop
information acquisition in exactly those 10 trials which
were above this value immediately after having seen the
first cue, whilst he or she should continue information
acquisition in exactly the other 10 trials. (An ORDM
model, in contrast, would assume that the participant
stops in all 20 trials after the first cue, whilst all MRDM
models predict a continuing information acquisition in all
20 trials.) These clear predictions can be tested for each
individual by a simple binomial test for the 20 trials.
2.1.3 The experimental paradigm: the horse race
In order to measure stopping behaviour, we chose an at-
tractive information board (see Figure 1) on which par-
ticipants could uncover cue information actively and se-
quentially. As a cover story, a fictitious horse race was in-
troduced allowing people to bet on the horse they thought
had the best chances of winning (based on the cues pro-
vided). In each trial, four new horses were presented ran-
domly (assembled out of a pool of a total of 125 names
minimal.
of Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Celtic and Germanic gods).
There was no prior knowledge of the winning probabil-
ities (base rate = .25). The external cues served as an
information basis to increase the probability of predict-
ing the winning horse in the current trial. These cues
were introduced to the participants in terms of personified
insider-knowledge cues. Every uncovered cue pointed to
one of the four horses (A, B, C or D) with a certain level
of probability. The degree of expertise (cue validity) was
displayed as the number of correct predictions the person-
ified cue had made in the last 100 races (possible values
were randomly distributed between 0 and 100). Thus, the
number of correct predictions corresponds to an observ-
able measure in terms of frequency of correct and incor-
rect tips of a cue. Each trial contained a new set of per-
sonified insider-knowledge cues so that participants could
not calculate, conclude or transfer any validity from pre-
vious trials.
A maximum of seven cues were available in each trial,
and these could only be uncovered sequentially in the or-
der provided (top to bottom) (see Figure 1). At least one
cue had to be uncovered in order to guarantee an evalu-
ation with the first value. The number of cues the par-
ticipants wanted to uncover was left to their discretion.
The information acquisition was followed by the decision
concerning the expected winning horse (A, B, C or D).
As soon as a person had bet on a certain horse he or she
received feedback as to whether this decision turned out
to be correct or not. The only other feedback consisted
of displaying the updated account: A correct prediction
resulted in winning 300 Swiss francs (CHF), which was
added to the partigcipant’s gambling account, minus the
spent acquisition costs (CHF 30 per uncovered cue). A
wrong prediction resulted in a commensurate loss, be-
cause the invested acquisition costs were deducted from
the gambling account. Participants were urged to maxi-
mize their gambling account by making as many correct
predictions as possible and collecting (fictitious) money.
The motivation of the participants was additionally in-
creased by the fact that the 10 participants with the high-
est total score entered a real lottery in which three lots of
CHF 100 were drawn.
Twenty-two participants were given a total of 152
forced-choice decision trials, each consisting of four op-
tions in the form of different horses. The 152 trials in-
cluded one practice trial, 51 trials for estimating the hy-
pothetical level (Stage 1), while 20 tested the calculated
level of confidence (Stage 2); (the remaining 80 trials in
Stage 2 served to investigate another research question,
namely varying the number of options; for results see
Hausmann & Läge, 2005). All participants were faced
with the same trials in Stage 1 (but in different random
orders), whilst the selection of trials for Stage 2 was adap-
tive to the individual DLC. In Stage 2, the 20 testing trials
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were randomly distributed within the set of 100 trials.
2.1.4 Results
The individually-calculated hypothetical DLCs in Stage
1 were situated between .52 and .88 (M = .73, SD = .09).
The minimum squared sum of errors was between .00 and
.11 (M = .03, SD = .03), meaning that some individuals
strictly followed a certain DLC (error .00), while others
showed more variability in their stopping behaviour.
The individually-calculated DLC was examined in
Stage 2 with 20 comparable trials. The expectation of the
error distributions in accordance with three decision mod-
els (DLC, ORDM and MRDM) and one random model
(expecting a uniform distribution of correct predictions
and errors) is presented in Figure 2. Out of the 440 tri-
als (20 trials for 22 participants), the DLC model pre-
dicted 400 trials correctly (91%). The superiority to the
other models is evident: ORDM correctly predicted only
214 trials (49%), MRDM 226 trials (51%). Therefore,
no more than 9% errors clearly speak in favour of a pre-
ferred and consistent use of a confidence threshold model
(DLC) at a group level.
On an individual level, each single participant can be
classified as a user of his or her confidence threshold
(binomial test, α = .05, which means that at least 15
out of the 20 trials had to follow the DLC prediction).
The same tests for the alternative models (ORDM and
MRDM) failed for all participants: only in the case of one
participant could it not be ruled out that she followed an
inconsistent MRDM-stopping rule (15 hits out of the 20
trials for both, MRDM prediction and DLC prediction).
In conclusion, people behave significantly according to
the measured DLC.
2.2 Experiment 2: Stopping rules in differ-
ent environments
The empirical testing of a desired level of confidence
(DLC) in the above experiment deals with environments
in which the information cues occur in an unforeseeable
random order (unstructured cue order according to their
validity). As explained in the introduction, the tested en-
vironment resembles the search rule of the Minimalist
heuristic. Hence, the next step is to examine whether the
existence of the DLC can be generalized to environments
in which cues appear in a descending order of their va-
lidities (structured cue order), just as specified for TTB.
If people were to know that the first available cue infor-
mation is also the most valid one, would they maintain a
level of confidence, or would they switch to an exclusive
ORDM-stopping rule strategy? ORDM seems plausible
because a second piece of information can never over-
rule the most valid cue. Therefore, people would have
to be prepared to continue the information search if in-
consistent information should arise. Hence, TTB — as a
representative of ORDM – should be a very reasonable
strategy in such a scenario. In terms of the DLC model,
however, one would expect that in some instances (when
the validity of the first cue exceeds the individual DLC)
people would stop their information search after the first
cue, while continuing in all those cases where the valid-
ity of the first cue is lower than their DLC. The reason
for continuing information search would not primarily be
to overrule the first cue, since more cues may point in
a different direction, but to gain more confidence before
making the decision. Considering such a motivation for
continued information search, even stopping after the sec-
ond cue (if supporting the first cue) would be considered
a “win” situation by the participant and not as a loss of
money. Therefore, obtaining more evidence would be
a driving force in information search. The fact that we
confront the same person with both environments (struc-
tured versus unstructured cues) allows a direct testing of
the stopping behaviour in a TTB-heuristic “friendly” en-
vironment.
2.2.1 Participants
Thirty-six participants (a majority of [mainly undergrad-
uate] students from the Philosophy Faculty of the Univer-
sity of Zurich and several employed individuals) took part
in the experiment. Twenty of the participants were female
and 16 male. The average age was 29.2 years (range 18–
44, SD = 5.1).
2.2.2 Materials and procedure
The experiment was programmed with Microsoft Visual
Basic 6 and run on IBM-compatible laptops. The pro-
gram interface and the horse race scenario were taken
from Experiment 1. This time, the participants were
given a total of 60 forced-choice decision trials, each of
which again consisted of four options. Mean validity of
the best cue in each trial was at .75 (SD = .12), the least
best cue had a validity of .57. Once more, a maximum of
seven cues was available in each trial and they could only
be uncovered sequentially in the order provided, while
at least one cue had to be uncovered so as to guarantee
an evaluation with the first value. Provided with the cue
validities of the uncovered cue(s), the participants were
required to bet on the horse with the best chances of win-
ning. Acquisition costs per cue and the possible winning
amount remained identical to Experiment 1 (only the dis-
played currency on the information board was changed
from Swiss francs to Euro).
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Models and their predictions
A pure ORDM-Stopping model
ORDM MRDM
V1 > DLC 10 0
V1 < DLC 10 0
A pure MRDM-Stopping model
ORDM MRDM
V1 > DLC 0 10
V1 < DLC 0 10
Stopping by chance (random model)
ORDM MRDM
V1 > DLC 5 5
V1 < DLC 5 5
Confidence threshold (DLC)
ORDM MRDM
V1 > DLC 10 0
V1 < DLC 0 10
Results
ORDM MRDM
V1 > DLC 9 12
V1 < DLC 11 9
Figure 2. The four examined models and their predictions. A pure ORDM-model would predict stopping after the
first uncovered cue (= ORDM-stopping behaviour) for all testing trials per person (N = 20) independent of the degree
of the validity of the first uncovered cue. A pure MRDM-model would predict a further search (no stopping after
the first cue) for all trials (= MRDM-stopping behaviour). A threshold model with an individual desired level of
confidence (DLC) would predict a stopping of information search as a function of the degree of validities: showing an
ORDM-stopping behaviour if the validity of the first uncovered cues reaches or exceeds the DLC and correspondingly
a MRDM-stopping if the validity is lower than the DLC. In comparison, a random model would result in an unspecific
stopping behaviour.
Results (on the third line) support the threshold model with only 4% (M = 0.77, SD = 1.11) errors of Type 1 (1 first
cue validity wrongly accepted) and 5% (M = 1.05, SD = 1.46) errors of Type 2 (2 first cue validity wrongly ignored),
with a total of 22 participants.
2.2.3 Design
We varied one two-level within-subjects factor, namely
the experimental condition of unstructured versus struc-
tured cue orders. Each condition consisted of 30 trials.
(The first trial served as a practice trial and was excluded
from analysis.) After the first 30 trials, a new window
appeared on the screen with the information that either
“from now on the cues will be sorted in descending or-
der of insider expertise”4 (structured cue order) or, “from
now on the cues will no longer be sorted”5 (unstructured
cue order). Participants were randomly assigned to start
with one of these orders.
4Followed by a more detailed explanation: “From now on the first
cue you uncover is automatically the one with the highest number of
forecasts (in the last 100 races). Within a trial every further uncovered
cue has therefore a smaller validity than the previous uncovered cues.”
5Followed by a more detailed explanation: “From now on the first
cue you uncover is no longer automatically the one with the highest
number of forecasts (in the last 100 races). Within a trial every further
uncovered cue can have an arbitrary validity.”
2.2.4 Results
The results of the calculations for the individual data
are summarized in the Appendix. For each participant,
the number of shown ORDM and MRDM trials is given
(amounting to 29 in each of the two conditions). On
average, MRDM was in the majority, even in the TTB-
friendly condition (M = 63.4%, SD = 26.9%, range 14–
100%). However, there is a significant increase of the
decisions based on one cue only (ORDM) from the Mini-
malist condition (M = 8.1, SD = 5.1) to the TTB condition
(M = 10.6, SD = 7.8; t[35] = 2.63, p = .007, one-tailed
paired). This tendency is to be expected because people
had to conclude from the instruction that they already had
the best cue information at hand and that the immediately
following piece of information would not be able to over-
rule it.
In addition to ORDM and MRDM stopping (which
could be counted directly), the individual DLC was cal-
culated for each condition (analogous to Experiment 1).
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On average, DLCs remained stable at M = .81 in both
conditions (t[35] = .75, p = .228, one-tailed paired): the
higher percentage of ORDM in the TTB condition did not
affect these calculated values.6
Conformity with the different stopping rules (DLC ver-
sus ORDM and MRDM) was individually tested by sep-
arate binomial tests (α = .05, requiring at least 21 cor-
rect predictions in the 29 trials). One participant showed
a clear MRDM strategy in the Minimalist condition and
maintained this behaviour in the TTB condition (no. 8).
Surprisingly, four more participants joined this strategy
in the TTB condition showing a DLC of 1.00. From the
remaining 31 subjects being classified as DLC-orientated
in their stopping rule during the Minimalist condition, 26
could be identified as DLC-orientated in the TTB con-
dition as well, whereas the remaining five participants
showed no significant stopping strategy in the TTB con-
dition.
There was an ambiguous classification of four subjects
of the TTB condition (nos. 9, 22, 18 and 12) with equal
or more than 21 trials with an ORDM-stopping behaviour
(out of 29): They could, alternatively to DLC, also be sig-
nificantly classified as one-reason decision makers (ap-
plying the same binomial test criterion as for the DLC-
strategy). Two of them (nos. 9 and 22), however, were
better described by the DLC measured in the TTB condi-
tion.
In conclusion, ORDM as a major strategy in the TTB-
friendly environment with structured cue validities is far
from being a common option for the participants in this
experiment. There are 13 participants decreasing their
DLC by >.02 (compared with the Minimalist condition),
but 11 participants use the same DLC in both conditions,
and 12 participants even increase it in the TTB-condition
by >.02. In both condition people are therefore not will-
ing to accept any cue validity as the single reason to make
a final decision.
2.2.5 Performance
Performance of individuals should be seen in the light of
“normative” behaviour, which in this particular experi-
ment is the best general constant rule (or combination of
general rules) to stop information search. Hence, the crit-
ical question is whether it is appropriate to continue in-
formation acquisition after the first (and mandatory) cue
6Participants consequently following the TTB stopping rule in the
environment of descending cue validities would be expected to show
a DLC of .57 (since this was the minimum “best cue” in the 29 anal-
ysed trials). Not a single participant showed this behaviour: everybody
violated the TTB stopping rule at least from time to time. Even the in-
dividual (no. 18) showing the lowest DLC — therefore being closest to
the ORDM stopping rule — reported after the experiment that he had
established an explicit DLC of approx. .62 as his stopping rule during
the experiment.
is uncovered. Additional information acquisition is only
of purpose when the initial cue information is overruled
by the following cues. Should this be the case, the re-
sulting expected value must exceed the initial expected
value after the first uncovered cue. An a posteriori analy-
sis of all trials in this experiment shows that this is never
the case in the TTB condition. In the Minimalist con-
dition three trials could be identified in which continued
information acquisition would be the optimal behaviour
(in one of these instances, three cues would have to be
uncovered, in two trials even four cues). Since these tri-
als (starting with cue validities of .70, .63, and .35) are
not the ones providing the worst initial cues, it is un-
predictable for the subjects that they should continue in-
formation acquisition in exactly these trials. Since these
cases cannot be subsumed under a general rule, a conse-
quent ORDM would be the normative behaviour for the
subjects regarding the state of knowledge they have when
conducting the experiment. This strategy would lead to a
performance of C 5370 in the Minimalist condition and C
5430 in the TTB condition. It can only be outperformed if
one subject accidently violates the ORDM stopping rule
in the unpredictable three trials mentioned above: In the
Minimalist condition, there was such a chance to beat the
ORDM performance with a constant threshold of .88 be-
cause this led to 100% correct answers. For the TTB
condition, there was no such chance by whatever con-
stant threshold. However, unpredictable inconsistent be-
haviour could by chance outperform the optimal strategy
(and did in one case).7
Average performance in Minimalist condition was at
C 5395 (SD = 435) which means that participants turned
out to perform as well as the rational model (C 5370). In-
dividual performance and threshold were negatively cor-
related (p = -.56): expanded information acquisition did
not pay. Average performance in the TTB condition was
at C 4438 (SD = 667) and therefore much lower than the
rational ORDM stopping rule would have been (C 5430).
Only one participant was able to outperform the rational
model (using a threshold of .66 and breaking his rule by
pure luck in the right moments). Again, individual per-
formance and threshold were negatively correlated (p =
-.61) which indicates that the more a participant behaved
according to the ORDM stopping rule the more money he
or she could earn.
7Information integration models perform less well because addi-
tional acquisition becomes too costly and does not substantially enhance
the quality of the decisions. In the best case (stopping immediately after
finding two cues indicating the same decision), the performance is at C
4380 in the TTB condition and C 3570 in the Minimalist condition.
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3 Discussion
One of the advantages of the sequential evidence accu-
mulation approach is that researchers will have a more
precise view of the individual decision making process.
Classification into the three building blocks (search, stop-
ping and decision rule) (Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Re-
search Group, 1999) has already proved to be a useful
instrument in describing individual decision behaviour in
multi-attribute settings with probability cues. Although
the decision rule has been predominant for a long time
in the research history of decision making, the empirical
support for an evidence accumulation approach reveals
that the stopping rule is crucial indeed: it expresses the
need for people to know at which point they have accu-
mulated sufficient information on the pending decision
problem. If they reach this point by accumulating evi-
dence, they already “know” how they have to decide be-
cause in most of the cases it is obvious. As in the best
case, with only one discriminating cue, the decision rule
becomes trivial: “decide in the direction the cue points
to” (see Lee & Cummins, 2004).
3.1 Empirical indications for a DLC
In Experiment 1, we tested the desired level of confidence
(DLC) with a very simple and direct method on the ba-
sis of the first uncovered cue. The horse race experiment
showed very clear empirical data confirming the hypothe-
sis of individual confidence thresholds (with a mean DLC
of .73 in Experiment 1). The “inconsistent” behaviour
Newell and other colleagues noted earlier can now be
seen as a systematic search and decision pattern in nearly
all of the tested participants: if the evidence from the first
uncovered cue (validity) reached or exceeded the DLC,
participants followed an ORDM, and if the value of the
current cue validity was lower than the DLC, participants
correspondingly searched for further information (viola-
tion of the stopping rule of ORDM) in order to increase
their confidence.
At present, we still know very little about how people
deal with conflicting information or, generally, what they
do by continuing to search after discriminating cues have
been found. Our experimental design was consequently
confined to the question as to whether information search
is stopped or continued after having the first cue informa-
tion in hand, so that only assumptions about possible in-
formation integration can be made. At present, the main-
tenance of the DLC and the assumptions of an integration
of validities are highly hypothetical and require further
systematic investigation with a different or expanded ex-
perimental design.
In Experiment 2, we furthermore found a certain ro-
bustness, contrary to important changing environmental
factors such as cue structure (Minimalist- versus TTB-
related cue order). People apply a confidence threshold
not only in environments with cues appearing in a ran-
dom order, but they also do so if they explicitly know
that cues are well structured and cue validities appear in
a descending order. This is far from normative behaviour
because a second discriminating cue with a lower validity
has no extra benefit in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. In
the best case, new information can only confirm the di-
rection of the first cue and therefore increase confidence.
Precisely this desire for more confidence could be the key
to understand the ongoing search in special cases (if cur-
rent confidence < desired confidence). Therefore, being
confident could have a value per se.
The desired level of confidence would be only one
(nevertheless crucial) component in an integral process
model of evidence accumulation. Therefore, influencing
factors should be evaluated and tested empirically. A cen-
tral environmental factor is the importance of the deci-
sion consequences for the individual (see also Lanzetta
& Driscoll, 1968; Böckenholt, Albert, Aschenbrenner &
Schmalhofer, 1991): Hausmann and Läge (2005), for ex-
ample, were able to show that participants adjusted their
DLC with changing amounts of possible winnings. Other
environments should also be included in further research;
for instance, Browne and Pitts (2004) suggested different
types of problems (for example, choice problems versus
design problems) in which people could have used differ-
ent stopping rules (convergence towards a solution versus
sufficiency of information).
As a surprising result, Hausmann and Läge (2005)
showed an independence of the DLC from the number of
options. It seems as if most people attach greater impor-
tance to confidence (“most probably I am correct”) than
to normative behaviour (“I am significantly better than
the base rate”) when making their decisions.
3.2 Theoretical indications for a DLC:
evidence accumulation and threshold
models
In general, sequential sampling models assume an ac-
cumulation of information until there is sufficient evi-
dence to favour one option. More or less independently
from each other, different authors have similarly termed
such an internal confidence threshold: “level of aspira-
tion” (Lanzetta & Kanareff, 1962), “desire to produce an
accurate response” (Hulland & Kleinmuntz, 1994), “de-
sired level of judgmental confidence” (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993), “desired level of confidence” (Hausmann & Läge,
2005), or “evidence accrual” (Lee & Cummins, 2004).
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3.2.1 Heuristic and systematic information process-
ing and the Principle of Sufficiency within and
beyond the persuasion context
The “heuristic-systematic model” (HSM) from Chaiken,
Liberman, and Eagly (1989) distinguishes between two
different modes of information processing: systematic in-
formation processing on the one hand needs a consider-
able cognitive effort in comprehending, evaluating und
integrating the message’s arguments in forming a final
judgment, whereas on the other hand heuristic processing
is less effortful and can include specific simple decision
rules, schemata, or heuristics that mediate people’s atti-
tudes such as, for example, the use of heuristic cues as
source expertise (“experts’ statements can be trusted”),
source likeability, message length, and consensus infor-
mation. One basic assumption of the model (in persua-
sion settings) is that people must be motivated to engage
in systematic processing, because people — as economy-
minded souls — prefer less effortful to more effortful
modes of information processing. But the “sufficiency
principle” (the underlying motivation to hold accurate
and valid attitudes) forces efficient information proces-
sors to strike a balance between minimizing their pro-
cessing efforts and maximizing their judgmental confi-
dence. The effected processing efforts (heuristic versus
systematic) can therefore be viewed as a function of the
discrepancy that exists between actual and desired levels
of confidence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993): “. . . that peo-
ple will exert whatever level of effort is required to attain
a sufficient degree of confidence that they have satisfac-
torily accomplished their processing goals” (Chaiken et
al., 1989, p. 221). Although the underlying searching
and stopping processes haven’t been tested empirically,
Eagly, Chaiken, and their co-authors, have — within the
field of social psychology — developed the idea of an
individual confidence threshold (criterion point of suffi-
cient or desired confidence) which can vary as a function
of individual difference and situational factors.
In his article “Re-visions of rationality?”, Newell
(2005) implicitly anticipates the advantages of such flexi-
ble threshold models. The repeatedly observed individual
variability in decision making could be explained in one
model, and a single threshold model could replace several
discrete models (assuming, for example, that the thresh-
old becomes higher the more important the decision is, or
becomes lower the more exacting the time pressure is —
down to consequent ORDM, or even guessing when time
pressure is too exigent). In this respect, single heuristics
in the adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) could be
considered as a special case of a general threshold model
(Lee & Cummins, 2004). Newell accurately expresses
this when he says: “The ‘adjustable spanner’ perspec-
tive suggests that only one tool is used and that different
thresholds of accumulated evidence give rise to patterns
of data that ‘mimic’ the stopping rule of the heuristics”
(2005, p. 13). Hence, a confidence threshold would be
the normal stopping rule, and the search behaviour ob-
served would correspond to a specific single heuristic.
3.2.2 Alternative threshold models under uncer-
tainty
Evidence accumulating approaches commonly try to
model the individual decision process to include a stage
of sequential gathering of information (search rule), the
reaching of a threshold (stopping rule) and the decision
for one of the options (a simple decision rule). For
nearly all of these models, the termination of informa-
tion search when reaching a threshold (stopping rule) is
crucial. Apart from the two extremes (“search as much as
you will find” and “search for one good reason”), many
assumptions have been made and numerous investiga-
tions about different types of stopping thresholds have
been conducted. In general, there could be more than
one stopping mechanism (Newell’s “adjustable spanner”
[2005] assumes a certain degree of flexibility), especially
when considering that strategies are adapted to environ-
ments and circumstances. Time pressure (adhering to
deadlines) can be mentioned as an external threshold, as
well as cost arguments or other constraints (search costs,
limited cognitive or material resources) (Simon, 1956).
3.2.3 Cost-benefit analysis as a stopping rule
The most explored threshold is probably that in cost-
benefit models. The selection of different decision strate-
gies has been seen as a result of a cost-benefit analy-
sis in the way that people choose the strategy that re-
quires the least investment for a satisfactory solution
(Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne, Bettman & Johnson,
1988). Several authors have shown that information
costs and awards do significantly affect depth, variability
and latency of search (for example Lanzetta & Kanareff,
1962; Edwards & Slovic, 1965; Connolly & Serre, 1984;
Gilliland, Schmitt & Wood, 1993; Saad & Russo, 1996;
for an overview, see Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993).
For example, lower search costs can lead to an extension
of searched information, whereas higher search costs can
lead to a restriction (for an overview, see Payne et al.,
1993).
Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group ar-
gued against the rule “stop search when costs out-
weigh benefits” (listing it under “optimization under con-
straints”) because it would lead to an infinite calculating
regress (1999, p. 11). Hausmann, Christen, and Läge
(2006) proposed a simple mathematical model to calcu-
late the economic value of the next obtainable cue only
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(assuming people would be able to do this). In their ex-
periment, they showed that people were cost-sensitive
in principle, but they greatly overestimated the benefit
of probabilistic information and spent — seen from a
normative viewpoint — with increasing search cost, too
much money for information. The authors interpreted this
empirical fact as meaning that having useful (discriminat-
ing) information is valued higher than maximizing one’s
profit. Furthermore, people may collect information to
avoid a pure guessing strategy. Other authors who have
examined the decision process more closely came to a
similar conclusion that individual information acquisition
is more probably terminated by the principle of sufficient
evidence (see for example Lee & Cummins, 2004).
3.2.4 Decision field theory as a threshold theory spe-
cific to preferential choice
A parallel approach, but explicitly related to preferential
choice, is the decision field theory (DFT, see Busemeyer
& Townsend, 1993; Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002). This
model assumes a defined strength of preference at each
stage of deliberating the different options. Should the in-
dividual express his or her preference, he or she would
choose the one option with the highest strength of prefer-
ence at that given moment. DFT defines a certain varia-
tion in the strength of preference for each of the options
(and can therefore predict phenomena like preference re-
versal), but assumes only deliberation time and no active
search for further information as a factor for this variabil-
ity.
The DFT stopping rule is implemented either as fixed
stopping time or as optional stopping time. The latter
case shows a certain similarity with the desired level of
confidence, because a critical strength of preference for
one of the options is required to stop the process. How-
ever, each option in the preferential choice frame has a
strength of preference independent of the others (they do
not sum to 1.00 like the options in the horse race scenario
presented above), so that no direct comparison between
the stopping behaviour of the DFT (a critical strength of
preference) and the DLC (a critical degree of certainty)
can be made. The general conception in the theoretical
framework, however, overlaps with the idea of a desired
level of confidence by assuming a threshold that triggers
the moment for the decision, and both models assume that
no further information integration is then necessary to de-
fine the chosen option.
3.2.5 Sequential-sampling processes for
psychophysical tasks
It is important to distinguish between conscious, strategic
decisions (driven by reasoning and by emotions) and un-
conscious neural “decisions” on the level of psychophys-
iology. In the latter field, threshold models are very com-
mon for describing the process of distinction between a
set of alternatives. Neurons seem to accumulate a sort of
“evidence” before transmitting to the next neurons. Self-
regulating Accumulator Models elaborated by Smith and
Vickers (1988), and Vickers and Lee (1998, 2000), based
on Vickers (1979), form an interesting approach even us-
ing terms like “level of confidence”. Since much of this
work deals with lower-level (neural-based) analysis these
models go beyond the scope of the current paper. Even
though the work emphasizes that sequential evidence ac-
cumulation is a common procedure, these models cannot
be referred to in detail within the framework of this paper.
3.3 Final conclusions
When carefully analysing all the models mentioned and
other studies concerning evidence accumulation, one can
conclude that several factors have an influence on the
termination of information search, including information
costs, amount of payoff, time pressure, complexity, im-
portance, experience, and the level of confidence. There
are several studies combining some of these factors, for
example Lanzetta and Kanareff (1962; cost, payoff, as-
piration), and Hulland and Kleinmuntz (1994; cost, time
pressure, payoff, and experience). Other factors such as
information costs, amount of payoff, time pressure, com-
plexity, importance, experience, etc. are thought to be
able to change the DLC in a specific decision task and
can therefore indirectly influence the stopping of infor-
mation search.
The concept of the desired level of confidence as a
stopping rule in evidence accumulation tasks needs to
be investigated in more detail, especially in other exper-
imental settings. We are confident that further research
in the field of sequential evidence accumulation, espe-
cially on the investigation of factors influencing the set-
ting or the adjustment of the desired level of confidence,
could be the key to helping us reveal and understand the
complex connections contexts and mechanisms of deci-
sion behaviour under uncertainty.
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Appendix: Stopping behavior in Ex-
periment 2.
The table on the next page shows participants’ stopping
behaviour in Experiment 2 (n = 36) in the Minimal-
ist condition (uncovered cue validities were randomly
distributed) and the TTB condition (cue validities were
structured in a decreasing order). For both conditions the
number of ORDM (information search stopped after the
first uncovered cue) and MRDM (search continued after
the first uncovered cue) is shown (amounting to a total of
29 trials for each condition). The desired level of con-
fidence (DLC) was calculated for both conditions sepa-
rately (level with the minimal sum of error values; for de-
tails see Experiment 1 or Hausmann & Läge, 2005). The
number of DLC hits was calculated from the number of
correctly used ORDM (when the first uncovered cue va-
lidity was equal to or higher than the calculated DLC) and
the number of correctly used MRDM (when the first un-
covered cue validity was lower than the calculated DLC).
The classification of a DLC-stopping strategy was de-
duced if the number of DLC hits was equal to or larger
than 21 (binomial test, α = .50); a non-significant num-
ber (< 21) was classified as “none” strategy. A classi-
fication of an MRDM-stopping strategy was deduced if
the number of MRDM was 29 (100% of the trials), and
an ORDM-stopping strategy would have been resolved if
the number of ORDM was 0.
Notes on the table:
S = Participant number
Seq. = Sequence of the minimalist and TTB-condition
(Min-TTB or TTB-Min) Minimalist condition: Column
3 to 6 contains the number (#) of trials following one of
the models (ORDM, MRDM), the calculation (calc.) of
the DLC, and the number of DLC hits.
TTB condition: Column 7 to 10 contains the num-
ber (#) of trials following one of the models (ORDM,
MRDM), the calculation (calc.) of the DLC, and the
number of DLC hits.
The last two columns indicate classification in the Min-
imalist and the TTB condition (DLC, ORDM, MRDM or
none).
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Stopping behavior in Experiment 2 (see last page).
Minimalist condition TTB condition Classification
# of # of Calc. # of # of # of Calc. # of Minimalist TTB
S Seq. ORDM MRDM DLC DLC hits ORDM MRDM DLC DLC hits condition condition
8 Min-TTB 0 29 1.00 29 0 29 1.00 29 MRDM MRDM
14 Min-TTB 3 26 .91 27 0 29 1.00 29 DLC MRDM
1 Min-TTB 4 25 .89 26 0 29 1.00 29 DLC MRDM
3 Min-TTB 2 27 .89 26 0 29 1.00 29 DLC MRDM
32 TTB-Min 6 23 .81 22 0 29 1.00 29 DLC MRDM
23 TTB-Min 4 25 .89 29 2 27 .92 27 DLC DLC
33 TTB-Min 4 25 .89 29 5 24 .89 28 DLC DLC
27 TTB-Min 4 25 .88 27 4 25 .89 27 DLC DLC
34 TTB-Min 5 24 .87 27 1 28 .94 27 DLC DLC
6 Min-TTB 5 24 .87 27 10 19 .85 25 DLC DLC
35 TTB-Min 4 25 .86 26 7 22 .85 21 DLC DLC
13 Min-TTB 4 25 .85 22 1 28 .94 27 DLC DLC
11 Min-TTB 5 24 .84 25 2 27 .93 26 DLC DLC
5 Min-TTB 7 22 .84 26 6 23 .88 24 DLC DLC
7 Min-TTB 7 22 .84 26 7 22 .83 25 DLC DLC
15 Min-TTB 7 22 .82 29 4 25 .89 26 DLC DLC
16 Min-TTB 7 22 .82 24 13 16 .74 24 DLC DLC
29 TTB-Min 7 22 .81 27 15 14 .70 25 DLC DLC
2 Min-TTB 7 22 .80 27 9 20 .84 28 DLC DLC
10 Min-TTB 8 21 .80 27 12 17 .79 29 DLC DLC
9 Min-TTB 8 21 .80 27 22 7 .64 23 DLC DLC
20 TTB-Min 10 19 .78 27 17 12 .70 28 DLC DLC
19 TTB-Min 11 18 .76 25 17 12 .68 22 DLC DLC
25 TTB-Min 10 19 .76 24 18 11 .67 23 DLC DLC
28 TTB-Min 13 16 .75 27 15 14 .71 25 DLC DLC
17 TTB-Min 13 16 .75 29 17 12 .68 26 DLC DLC
30 TTB-Min 16 13 .72 24 11 18 .80 27 DLC DLC
26 TTB-Min 16 13 .72 28 16 13 .71 29 DLC DLC
31 TTB-Min 16 13 .72 29 16 13 .71 28 DLC DLC
22 TTB-Min 18 11 .72 23 23 6 .63 25 DLC DLC
18 TTB-Min 21 8 .67 28 25 4 .61 24 DLC DLC
12 Min-TTB 4 25 .89 29 21 8 .66 16 DLC none
36 TTB-Min 3 26 .85 23 17 12 .69 19 DLC none
24 TTB-Min 8 21 .81 26 20 9 .71 17 DLC none
4 Min-TTB 10 19 .78 29 11 18 .77 19 DLC none
21 TTB-Min 16 13 .72 23 18 11 .73 19 DLC none
